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RECENT CASES

PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW--CORPORATIONS--WEST GERMAN LAW
HELD TO DETERMINE SUCCESSOR TO ORIGINAL FOUNDATION
WHICH HAD BEEN LOCATED IN EAST GERMANY
Plaintiff, a West German foundation, 1 sued to enjoin
infringement of United States trademarks by defendant, an
East German "peoples-owned enterprise. 'r2 The original
Carl Zeiss Stiftung 3 was created at Jena in 1889 with the
required approval of the Duchy of Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach for
the purpose of owning and operating an optical business
for profit.4 In 1945, before Jena became part of the
Soviet Zone, United States military authorities evacuated
all members of the Zeiss Board of Management, as well as
key personnel, to Heidenheim, Wuerttemberg, in the United
States zone. 5 In 1948, the Soviet Union expropriated all
Zeiss assets in Jena, including its trademarks. The Zeiss
commercial enterprise at Jena was reorganized in 1951 and
became VEB Carl Zeiss, Jena, responsible solely to the
East German government. Following the Soviet expropriation,

1. Under the German Civil Code a Stiftung (foundation)
is used "exclusively for incorporated organizations owning
property which is devoted to a purpose which has been defined
in the statutes to the Stiftung." A board of management conducts the business according to the directives of the governing
statute. 1 E. COHN, MANUAL OF GERMAN LAW (1968).
2. V.E.B., as in V.E.B. Carl Zeiss Jena, is an abbreviation
of Volks-Einsitzung-Bearbeitung or "people's owned enterprise."
3. The original Carl Zeiss Stiftung registered the trademark "Carl Zeiss Jena" in the distinctive lens frame in 1907.
"Zeiss" alone was registered in 1912, followed by "CZ" in 1913,
and the distinctive lens frame alone in 1914. Zeiss Ikon A.G.,
a subsidiary of plaintiff Carl Zeiss Stiftung, joined as a
plaintiff to enforce the trademark "Zeiss Ikon."
4. In 1896 the governing "statute" of Carl Zeiss Stiftung
was approved. It was last amended in 1941. The statute provided that Carl Zeiss Stiftung was established as a private
foundation at Jena to own and operate an optical business for
profit.
5. The Zeiss Board named three employees to remain at
Jena and to act during the Board's absence until such time as
the Board would resume management at Jena.
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the Board of Management obtained a decree from the Minister
of State in Wuerttemberg to amend the foundation's statute
to create a new domicile in Heidenheim for Carl Zeiss
Stiftung. 6
In 1967, the Wuerttemberg decrees were affirmed
by an Act of the German Parliament.
Title to Zeiss trademarks purportedly had been vested
in the Alien Property Custodian of the United States in 1919.
Zeiss business in the United States was carried on through
Carl Zeiss, Inc., a New York corporation organized in 1925.
The capital stock of Carl Zeiss Inc. vested in the Alien
Property Custodian in 1942. 7 Beginning in 1950, East German
products bearing Zeiss trademarks were sold in the United
States through the Ercona Camera Corp. Ercona later obtained

6. From 1949 until 1954 Carl Zeiss Stiftung, and what
became VEB Carl Zeiss Jena, had an informal licensing
arrangement for the use of the "Zeiss" trademarks.
Carl
Zeiss Stiftung claimed at all times that it was entitled to
the trademarks, but offered to come to an agreement with the
East German firm for their use. The offer was tacitly
accepted by the East German Government as a "modus vivendi."
The agreement continued until 1954 when it broke down in a
dispute over licensing terms. Parallel litigation followed
in East and West German courts.
In 1954 district courts in
Goettingen and Duesseldorf enjoined VEB Carl Zeiss Jena from
selling its products carrying "Zeiss" trademarks in West
Germany. The Federal Supreme Court upheld this position in
1957, declaring that the board members in Heidenheim represented the original Stiftung as proprietor of the Zeiss firm.
A district court in Stuttgart dismissed an action brought
by representatives of Zeiss Jena in 1954 on the grounds that
Zeiss Jena was not a legal representative of the original
Carl Zeiss Stiftung and thus had no authority to bring the
action. The Federal Supreme Court upheld this decision in
1960.
In a 1954 advisory opinion the Supreme Court of East
Germany annulled the 1949 Wuerttemberg decree moving the
domicile of Zeiss Stiftung to Heidenheim. Zeiss Jena obtained
a default judgement against Zeiss Stiftung in the district
court of Leipsig which was upheld by the Supreme Court of
East Germany. Carl Zeiss Stiftung was not represented in
any of the East German actions.
7. Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917, 50 U.S.C. App.
1 et seq. (1965).
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a declaratory judgment against the Attorney General of the
United States, successor to the Alien Property Custodian,
enjoining him from putting an embargo on the importation
8
of East German goods carrying the 'rZeiss"r trademark.
Following that judgment, the Attorney General sold the
stock of Carl Zeiss, Inc. to plaintiff Carl Zeiss Stiftung.
At that time, the Attorney General expressed the view of
the United States Government that only Carl Zeiss Stiftung
of West Germany should be recognized as the legitimate
successor to the original Carl Zeiss Stiftung. In the
instant case, plaintiff contends that under German law it
is legally identifiable with the foundation created at Jena
in 1889 and therefore has the rights to the exclusive use
of all Carl Zeiss trademarks located in the United States.
Defendant contends that the foundation organized at Jena
never ceased to exist in Jena and therefore the "peoplesowned enterprise" is entitled to either exclusive or concurrent use of Zeiss trademarks in the United States. The
District Court held that defendant was barred from asserting
any claims to Uniteg States trademarks under the Trading
with the Enemy Act, and, in view of plaintiff's good faith
effort to carry out the purposes of the original foundation,
plaintiff was the legal successor to the original Carl
1 0
On appeal to the United States Court of
Zeiss Stiftung.I
Appeals for the Second Circuit, held, affirmed. 1 1 Since

8. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
held that since ownership of trademark rights exist only as
appurtenant to some manufacturing or marketing business conducted in the United States and since the Alien Property
Custodian made no effort to market Zeiss products, the 1919
seizure of Zeiss trademarks had no substance. The court did
not adjudicate the relative rights of VEB Carl Zeiss Jena
(Ercona) and Carl Zeiss Stiftung in the U.S. trademarks.
Rogers v. Ercona Camera Corp., 277 F.2d 94 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
9. 50 U.S.C. App. § 1 et seq. (1965). The court held
that under the act even if the vesting of title to U.S.
trademarks in the Attorney General was ineffective, Zeiss
Jena could not exercise any rights in these trademarks without approval from the Attorney General. See 8 C.F.R. § 507.46
(1970).
10. Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss Jena, 293
F. Supp. 892 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
11. Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss Jena, 433
F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1970).
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German law as interpreted by the courts of West Germany
provided means for a foundation to change its domicile
when the purposes for which it was created would be
otherwise frustrated and since the United States does not
recognize extraterritorial expropriation of property
located in the United States, the successor foundation,
Carl Zeiss Stiftung,has exclusive rights to Zeiss trademarks in the United States. 1 2 Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. VEB
Carl Zeiss Jena, 433 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1970).1 3
Trademarks registered in the United States for products
manufactured elsewhere are considered property located in
the United States. 14 Based on a policy of judicial restraint,
United States courts will not inquire into the validity of
acts of a foreign state with respect to property and

12. In addition, the Second Circuit overruled the
defenses of laches, acquiescence or abandonment, joint or
concurrent use of trademarks. It upheld the district court's
rejection of defendants anti-trust defense under the Lanham
Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1115 (1963), which the district court
reported in a separate opinion. Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. VEB
Carl Zeiss Jena, 298 F. Supp. 1309 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). The
court found, however, that the district court's award of
damages to plaintiff was not justified under the Lanham Act.
13. The events out of which this suit arose have
sparked litigation throughout the world. See Carl-ZeissStiftung v. Rayner & Keeler, Ltd. (1964) R.P.C. 299, aff'd
[1966] 2 All E.R. 536; Carl-Zeiss-Stiftung v. Rayner &
Keeler, Ltd., [1969] 3 All E.R. 897; V.E.B. Carl Zeiss,
Jena v. Firma Carl Zeiss Heidenheim, [1965] Entscheidungen
des Schweizerischen Bundesgerichts 117 (Swiss Federal Supreme
Court); Carl-Zeiss-Stiftung of Heidenheim v. Carl Zeiss
Stiftung, Jena, PLD 1968 Karachi 276 (High Court of West
Pakistan); Jenaer Glaswerk Schott & Gen., Mainz v. V.E.B.
Jenaer Glaswerk Schott & Gen., Jena, Oslo Town Court (Norway),
March 18, 1969); Carl Zeiss Stiftung, Heidenheim v. Carl Zeiss
Stiftung, Jena, not reported (Indian Joint Registrar of
Trademarks), March 12, 1968; Re Carl Zeiss Pty. Ltd.'s
Application, [1969] 43 ALJR 196 (Australia).
14. Zwack v. Kraus Bros., 237 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1956).
See Baglin v. Cusnier Co., 221 U.S. 580 (1911). In Baglin,
Carthusian monks sued to enforce their trademark "Chartreuse"
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interests situated within the alien's own territory. This
policy extends even to unrecognized governments acting within
the scope of their own control. 1 5 Recently, this policy,
known as the act of state doctrine, has been expanded by
statute to allow courts to inquire into the validity of a
confiscation of property by a foreign state when the confis16
cation is in violation of principles of international law.
This conforms to the general view of the United States
Government that expropriations are "contrary to our public
policy and shocking to our sense of justice."'1 7 However,
where a foreign state's act purports to affect property
located outside its own territory, a court is not restrained
from determining whether the act was done in accordance with
the applicable law. 1 8 Where property expropriated by a
foreign state is located within the United States at the
time of the attempted expropriation, courts will give effect
to the acts of the foreign state only when the acts are
19
"consistent with the policy and law of the United States."

against a French corporation. For centuries the monks had
produced Chartreuse in France, but when they failed to qualify
as an association under French law, they took their secret
formula to Spain where they continued its production. Their
equipment and assets in France were liquidated by the French
government and sold to a private concern which manufactured
a liqueur under the "Chartreuse" label. The Supreme Court
held that despite the order's removal from France to Spain
and despite the liquidation of its assets by the French
government, the order retained its exclusive use of the
"Chartreuse" trademark in the United States.
15. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
16. 22 U.S.C.A. § 2370 (Supp. 1971).
This statute was
a reaction to the Supreme Court's decision in Banco Nacional
de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). The Court held
that United States courts would not inquire into the validity
of acts of a foreign state even if they clearly violated
international law.
17. Iraq v. First National City Bank, 353 F.2d 47, 51
(2d Cir. 1965).
18. RESTATEMENT SECOND, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 43 (1965).
19. Iraq v. First National City Bank, 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir.
1965); RESTATEMENT SECOND, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 46 (1965).
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For purposes of determining which law governs a
origin. 2 0
corporation, courts have looked to the state of its
An entity such as a corporation or foundation is the creature
of the jurisdiction which creates it. 2 1 Under the German
Civil Code, adopted in 1900, an existing foundation was made
subject to federal authority rather than to the authority of
the state or principality in which it was created. Section
87 of the Civil Code provided that where a foundation's
purposes could no longer be fulfilled, the foundation's2 2
statute could be amended by the appropriate authority.
Settled court practice in West Germany, following the Civil
Code, permits foundations and corporations to transfer their
domicile from East Germany even if, under the Civil Code as
interpreted by East Germany, the corporation was prohibited
from transferring domicile or ceased to exist. 2 3 Although
the United States does not recognize the East German Government,
the United States is not prevented from recognizing East
German law as the law of a de facto government. 24 Acts of
unrecognized governments relating to local affairs usually
will be given effect. 25 In determining which law to apply,
however, United States foreign policy objectives must be
considered. 26 A key element of this policy is that the
United States Government recognizes West Germany as the only
legitimate German government.
In the instant case, the Second Circuit noted that the
parties were in accord on the application of the 1900 German
Civil Code to determine the successor to the original Carl
Zeiss Stiftung. 2 8 Consequently, the issue with which the
court was faced was whether the German Civil Code as

20. Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. Case, [1970]
I.C.J. 3, 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 227 (1970).
21. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519 (1839).
22. See Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss Jena,
293 F. Supp. 892 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
23. E. RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
54 (2d ed. 1960).
24. RESTATEMENT SECOND, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 113 (1965).
25. Id.
26. The Maret, 145 F.2d 431 (3d Cir. 1944).
27. 23 DEPT. STATE BULL. 530 (1950).
28. 433 F.2d 686, at 698.
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interpreted by the East Germans or by the West Germans
should be applied. The court held that this determination
depended on the nature of the issue. Although the lw of
an unrecognized government may be given effect in local
matters, the court said that the East German decisions concerning the legitimate successor foundation purported to
reach beyond East German jurisdiction, and thus were void.
Furthermore, since the Soviet expropriation decrees were
directed toward property outside Soviet jurisdiction, the
court held them ineffective as acts of state. The
Wuerttemberg decrees and the 1967 act of the West German
Parliament, acknowledging Carl Zeiss Stiftung's shift in
domicile from Jena to Heidenheim, were not effective acts
of state insofar as they attempted to change the status of
Zeiss assets outside West Germany. However, they were
effective to the extent that they gave legal status to the
foundation's de facto existence in West Germany as a continuation of the original foundation. Since the purpose for
which Carl Zeiss Stiftung was created could not be carried
out in Jena due to the Soviet expropriations, the court
found the West German application of the Civil Code valid
to transfer domicile. In addition, the court noted the
official United States view as promulgated by the Attorney
General, which recognizes Carl Zeiss Stiftung as the legitimate successor to the original. The Second Circuit, therefore,
held that without permission from the Attorney General, VEB
Carl Zeiss Jena was barred from asserting any claims to
United States trademarks under the Trading With the Enemy
Act. 2 9 In so ruling, the court found the West German
foundation to be the legitimate successor to the original
Carl Zeiss Stiftung and therefore entitled to the exclusive
use of registered Zeiss trademarks in the United States.
In view of United States foreign policy the findings
in the instant case should be no surprise. Given an East
German and a West German claimant, each of whom was supported
by meritorious arguments, and, additionally, given a valuable
United States asset to be allocated between them, the decision
was predictable. If, on the other hand, the court had in fact
recognized the legitimacy of the East German government to
act within its own jurisdiction, there would have existed a

29.

Id. at 703; 50 U.S.C. App. § 1 et sea. (1965).
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valid Zeiss enterprise within East Germany which held claims
to rights outside East Germany, i.e. United States trademarks. This is the same process of reasoning the court used
to find that the Wuerttemberg decrees gave rise to the
de facto existence of a Zeiss enterprise in West Germany
holding claims to rights outside West Germany. The court
here seems to have adopted the premise of the district court:
that VEB Carl Zeiss Jena "is but a sham and subterfuge,
erected solely for the purpose of litigation outside of East
Germany. . .

.
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Ultimately, then, this case is grounded

not only in a protective policy towards West Germany but also
in a more general policy disapproving uncompensated expropriations. Had the court recognized the "peoples-owned enterprise" as a successor of Carl Zeiss Stiftung under East German
law, it would have given legal recognition to an uncompensated
expropriation. Therefore, although the court said it would
accept the validity of East Germany's acts within its own
jurisdiction, it failed to do so. The court balanced the
policy underlying the act of state doctrine against the
policy underlying disapproval of uncompensated expropriations,
and found the latter to weigh more heavily.
The result of the present case may be to create additional
problems in trade between the United States and presently
unrecognized governments. Where two opposing claimants exist
to property located in the United States, one of the claimants
asserting rights under the law of the recognized government and
the other asserting rights under the law of the unrecognized
government, a United States court might use a double standard
to determine the applicable choice of law. In theory, the
application of the act of state doctrine would be identical
to determine the status of claims within each state's own
jurisdiction. However, given the principle of comity between
nations, a court may give greater consideration to the law of
thereby disadvantaging the corporation
a recognized nation,
Nonetheless, the instant case
from the unrecognized state.
stands for the principle that United States courts will give
effect to United States foreign policy whenever appropriate.
Using this standard the Second Circuit clearly reached the
correct decision.

30.
31.

293 F. Supp. 892, 897.
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
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